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The Invention of ÔHappinessÕ 
 
Phil Withington, University of Sheffield 
 
 
An Early Modern Puzzle 
This chapter starts with a puzzle. The word ÔhappinessÕ is absent from the 
first English version of Thomas MoreÕs Utopia, which was translated into 
English from the Latin in 1551 and again in 1556 by Ralph Robinson.1 
ÔHappinessÕ remains absent from the next four editions of RobinsonÕs 
translation, which was republished regularly to 1639.2 But when Gilbert 
Burnet translated Utopia anew from the Latin, in 1684, he used ÔhappinessÕ 
no less than nineteen times.3 What follows looks to explain and 
contextualize this striking semantic development. Or, to put that slightly 
differently, the chapter asks whether this change in the language of Utopia, 
and the apparent emergence of ÔhappinessÕ it suggests, was simply a 
peculiarity of translation or symptomatic of wider semantic and cultural 
change. 
 
There are at least two reasons for asking these questions. The most 
obvious is to provide a deeper historical perspective on what can only be 
described as a modern obsession. A prevailing feature of contemporary 
western governments and corporations is their interest in understanding, 
measuring, and improving the happiness of populations. The political 
scientist William Davies has decried the emergence of what he calls the 
Ôhappiness industryÕ, noting that, for leaders of big business, happiness Ôin its 
various guises, is no longer some pleasant add-on to the more important 
business of making moneyÕ. Rather, as Ôa measurable, visible, improvable 
entity, it has now penetrated the citadel of global economic managementÕ.4 
                                                        
1 Thomas More, A Fruitful and Pleasant Work of the Best State of a Publyque Weale, and of the 
new Isle Called Utopia, trans. Ralph Robinson (1551); A Fruitful Pleasant, Witty Work, of the 
Best State of a Publique Weale, and of the New Isle Called Utopia, trans. Ralph Robinson (1556). 
In what follows all quotations from the 1556 version are taken from David Harris Sacks, 
ed., Utopia (Boston, Mass., 1997). 
2 Thomas More, A Most Pleasant, Fruitful, and Witty Wore, of the Best State of a Publique Weale, 
and of the new Isle called Utopia, translated by Ralph Robinson (1597); Sir Thomas More's 
Utopia Containing, an Excellent, Learned, Witty, and Pleasant Discourse of the Best State of a 
Publike Weale, as it is found in the Government of the new Isle called Utopia, trans. Ralph 
Robinson (1624); The Common-wealth of Utopia containing a Learned and Pleasant Discourse of 
the Best State of a Publike Weale, as it is found in the Government of the new Isle called Utopia trans. 
Ralph Robinson (1639). 
3 Thomas More, Utopia, trans. Gilbert Burnet (1684). 
4 William Davies, The Happiness Industry: How the Government and Big Business Sold Us Well-
Being (London, 2015), 3. 
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In the meantime, the perennial success of Ôhow to be happyÕ books like Paul 
DolanÕs Happiness by Design suggest that individuals are quite as interested in 
securing and improving their personal happiness.5 Although Dolan and 
Davies differ in terms of their evaluation of ÔhappinessÕ, they nevertheless 
share important and more representative assumptions. Both assume a stable 
concept of happiness as a state or condition that it is possible for 
individuals, institutions, and societies at once to engineer and attain and to 
measure and compare. And both trace the origins of this concept to the 
Enlightenment in general and the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham 
in particular.6 As Davies tells it, Bentham had a ÔEurekaÕ moment when he 
read these words from Joseph PriestleyÕs Essay on Government in a London 
coffeehouse in 1766: ÔThe good and happiness of the members, that is, the 
majority of the members, of any state, is the great standard by which 
everything relating to that state must finally be determinedÕ.7 Or as the 
American Declaration of Independence put it a decade later, in 1776: ÔWe 
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of HappinessÕ.8  
 
This paper argues, in contrast, that the genesis of the modern concept 
of happiness was a century or two before Bentham read his Priestley or 
Thomas Jefferson scripted the Declaration. But taking the story back 
reveals, secondly, that ÔhappinessÕ has not always been as conceptually stable 
as contemporary commentators, or indeed historians, assume Ð that, indeed, 
it was only in the sixteenth century that the word began to acquire the 
meanings with which we associate it today. In exploring the conceptual 
mutability of ÔhappinessÕ the paper looks to contribute to what Keith 
Thomas describes as the Ôretrospective ethnography of early modern 
EnglandÕ: Ôapproaching the past in the way an anthropologist might 
approach some exotic societyÕ and identifying Ôsome of the central values of 
the English peopleÕ and Ôthe ways in which these values were accepted, 
challenged and reformulated in response to the social and cultural 
developments of the timeÕ.9 But while the pursuit of such values is 
admirable in theory, ThomasÕs own methodological caveats indicate that 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
5 Paul Dolan, Happiness by Design: Finding Pleasure and Purpose in Everyday Life (London, 
2014) 
6 Dolan, Happiness, 6-7; Davies, Happiness, 13-39. 
7 Davies, Happiness, 13. 
8 Jack, N. Rakove, Annotated U.S. Constitution and Declaration of Independence (Harvard, 
2009), 73. 
9 Keith Thomas, The Ends of Life: Roads to Fulfilment in Early Modern England (Oxford, 
2010), 2. 
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finding and fathoming them is much more difficult in practice. There is, as 
he notes, Ôthe tangled inheritance of incompatible ideasÕ to deal with 
(Ôclassical, Christian and chivalricÕ); the problem of relating Ôintellectually 
sophisticated works of theology and philosophyÕ to Ôthe desires and 
dilemmas of ordinary lifeÕ; the need to read printed texts in ÔcontextÕ; and, 
perhaps most importantly, the problem of deconstructing Ôthe linguistic and 
conceptual resourcesÕ that Ôinevitably constrainedÕ how contemporaries 
expressed themselves.10 Thomas acknowledges these complexities in order 
to ignore them: his method of recovering early modern values is to provide 
what he terms a Ôcollage of quotationsÕ and leave context, genre, discourse, 
and language largely to one side.11 The method here, in contrast, is to focus 
less on values and more on the most basic resource of their expression: 
words. What follows is accordingly concerned in a quite precise and literal 
way with the word ÔhappinessÕ and what early modern writers may have 
meant when they used it. 
 
Over the last few decades, semantic histories and studies of 
ÔkeywordsÕ have become an established feature of early modern 
historiography.12 This makes it all the more surprising, perhaps, that a word 
as important as happiness should have received so little attention from 
historians.13 A recent exception is Paul SlackÕs account of the development 
of English Ôpolitical economyÕ Ð a new way of thinking and writing about the 
world that emerged in the face of EnglandÕs quickening commercial growth 
and imperial expansion in the seventeenth century.14 SlackÕs premise is that 
Ôwhen authors of different kinds and in different contexts were beginning to 
use similar language, it is possible to argue that the intellectual equipment of 
an important sector of public opinion, that of the educated, was shiftingÕ.15 
Happiness was one such piece of Ôintellectual equipmentÕ. Slack accordingly 
notes that happiness was an ancient and ÔscholasticÕ term that could be put 
to Ôvarious usesÕ, Ôcould embody a number of sometimes contending 
                                                        
10 Thomas, Ends, 5-6. 
11 Ibid., 5. 
12 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (London, 1976); 
Quentin Skinner, ÔThe Idea of the Cultural LexiconÕ and ÔRetrospect: Studying Language 
and Conceptual ChangeÕ in Visions of Politics: Volume I: Regarding Method (Cambridge, 
2002), 158-188; ÔTowards a Social and Cultural History of Keywords and Concepts by 
the Early Modern Research Group,Õ History of Political Thought XXXI (Autumn, 2010), 
427-48; Phil Withington, Society in Early Modern England: the Vernacular Origins of Some 
Powerful Ideas (Cambridge, Polity, 2010). 
13 It is absent from WilliamsÕ original Keywords and Tony Bennett et al, New Keywords: A 
Revised Vocabulary of Culture and Society (Oxford, Blackwell, 2005). 
14 Paul Slack, The Invention of Improvement: Information & Material Progress in Seventeenth-century 
England (Oxford, 2015), 4-8, 112-14. 
15 Paul Slack, ÔMaterial Progress and the Challenge of Affluence in Seventeenth-Century 
England, EcHR, 2009, Vol. 62 (3), 592. 
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associationsÕ, and traditionally lauded Ôthe active pursuit of virtue and the 
common goodÕ.16 Around the middle of the seventeenth century, however, 
circumstances Ôconspired to accelerate its long evolution from a rare 
experience, the fruit of supreme virtue scarcely attainable in this world, to a 
commonplace mixture of physical well-being and psychological contentÕ.17 
Crucial in this respect were the interventions of the Hartlib Circle, who 
chose happiness as one of the words with which to frame their projects for 
public improvement. Thereafter, Restoration political economists like John 
Houghton and Nicholas Barbon deployed Ôa shared vocabulary of 
happiness, in titles and texts, in order to validate the pursuit of consumer 
self-interest and national aggrandisementÕ.18 The result was that by Ôone 
route or another, and under the cloak of the individual and collective pursuit 
of happiness, acquisitive and competitive appetites became as worthy of 
serious attention, if not quite so respectable, as material progressÕ.19 
 
For Slack, then, the later seventeenth century was a pivotal moment 
in the history of happiness, with political economists taking the old word 
and giving it modern connotations. This paper takes a longer and broader 
view: it traces the use of ÔhappinessÕ in printed vernacular texts back to the 
fifteenth century and considers its adoption in more than just works of 
political economy. It takes its cue from the historical linguist Matti 
RissanenÕs important insight that the noun ÔhappinessÕ was not, in fact, a 
perennial term of contentment that early moderns simply inherited 
unquestionably from the ancient and medieval worlds.20 Rissanen shows, 
rather, that ÔhappinessÕ was unavailable for prominent fourteenth- and 
fifteenth-century writers to translate what subsequently became its Latin 
synonyms into the vernacular: felicitas (denoting worldly contentment) or 
beatitude (denoting spiritual fulfillment and redemption). While Geoffrey 
Chaucer resorted to his own coinage Ð ÔwelefulnesÕ Ð to translate felicitas, the 
translator and Augustinian canon John Walton preferred to borrow the 
French ÔfelicityÕ; and both writers used ÔblissfulnessÕ (subsequently 
ÔblessednessÕ) for beatitudo.21 Indeed according to Rissanen it was not until 
the middle of the sixteenth century that ÔhappinessÕ even appeared in printed 
English texts and only after 1600 that it began to be used with any 
consistency.22  
                                                        
16 Paul Slack, ÔThe Politics of Consumption and England's Happiness in the Later 
Seventeenth CenturyÕ, EHR, June 2007, Vol.122 (497), 629-30. 
17 Slack, Invention, 111Ð12; ÔMaterial ProgressÕ, 589-90. 
18 Slack, ÔPolitics of ConsumptionÕ, 629. 
19 Slack, ÔMaterial ProgressÕ, 592. 
20 Matti Rissanen, ÒIn Search of Happiness: Felicitas and Beatitudo in Early English 
Boethius Translations,ÓStudia Anglica Posnaniensia 31 (1997), 237Ð48. 
21 Ibid., 242. 
22 Ibid., 246. 
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If Rissanen is right, then any adaptation of ÔhappinessÕ after 1650 has 
to be understood as part of a longer process of linguistic and semantic 
change that saw the word quite rapidly supplant Ôfairly well-established loan 
wordÕ Ð felicity Ð and Ônative derivativesÕ like blessedness.23 It transpires that 
his analysis is mostly, though not entirely, accurate. Although ÔhappinessÕ 
was absent from the lexicon of Chaucer and Walton circa 1410, by 1473 
William Caxton was able to use the word in his translation of Raoul 
LefevreÕs French History of Troy, one of the very first texts to be printed in 
English.24 That it was used in vernacular printed texts thereafter Ð albeit only 
very occasionally until the 1550s Ð suggests that ÔhappinessÕ was not absent 
from the first English translations of Utopia because the vocabulary was 
unknown to Robinson, as might be inferred from RissanenÕs account, but 
because ÔhappinessÕ was not yet known to mean all the things it did by 1684, 
when Burnet rendered MoreÕs text into Ômore Modern EnglishÕ.25 Indeed, 
closer consideration of the semantics of happiness circa 1550 reveals them to 
be quite as dynamic and formative as those circa 1650. This is because it was 
only in the early sixteenth century that ÔhappinessÕ began to accumulate the 
concepts and associations that enabled early Enlightenment authors like 
Burnet to give the word paradigmatic status.  
 
What follows accordingly explains why Gilbert Burnet was able to 
turn Utopia into a book about happiness. In telling this story the paper 
divides into three sections. The first considers the conceptual formation of 
ÔhappinessÕ up to the 1550s, showing how a medieval term rooted in the 
concept of ÔhapÕ acquired a range of concepts and meanings integral to 
Reformation and Renaissance culture: how happiness turned, in effect, from 
a relatively simple noun into the Ôcomplex wordÕ beloved by Burnet.26 
Section two then provides a rough and ready quantification of what happens 
to the word after 1559 by using digital technology to trace its appearance in 
printed texts and titlepages. The rapid ascent of ÔhappinessÕ into a 
seventeenth-century commonplace explains, finally, BurnetÕs predilection 
for the word. 
 
 
The Conceptual Formation of Happiness 
ÔHappinessÕ derived from the Old Norse noun ÔhapÕ, meaning luck or 
fortune, was probably in use by the mid-fifteenth century. Before the 1550s 
the semantics of ÔhappinessÕ were largely informed by this provenance: the 
                                                        
23 Ibid., 247. 
24 Raoul Lefevre, Here Beginneth the Volume Intituled and Named the Recuyell of the Histories of 
Troy, trans. William Caxton (1473), 10r. 
25 Utopia, trans. Burnet, A7r. 
26 William Empson, The Structure of Complex Words (Cambridge Mass., 1989). 
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addition of the English suffix ÔnessÕ to the adjective ÔhappyÕ made for a word 
that indicated the quality and state of hap (i.e. fortune) or the circumstances 
and phenomena that exemplified such a condition. It was precisely on this 
basis that Caxton first used ÔhappinessÕ in print in 1473, the character Saturn 
lamenting (on receiving an unfavourable prophecy from Delphi) that, even 
if Ôall my life hath been nourished in happinessÕ, he would now Ôbe called & 
said unhappyÕ.27 Likewise the text that used ÔhappinessÕ most often in the 
hundred years after 1473 reproduced the same semantics. Thomas HobyÕs 
translation of CastiglioneÕs The Courtier (1561) used ÔhappinessÕ twenty times, 
and as Hoby has an interlocutor note in the second book:  
 
For since ill is contrary to good, and good to ill, it is (in a manner) 
necessary by contrary and a certain counterpoise the one should É 
strengthen the other, and where the one wants or increases, the other 
to want or increase also: because no contrary is without his other 
contrary. Who knows not that there should be no Justice in the 
world, were it not for wrongs? No stoutness of courage, were there 
not fainthearted? Nor continence, were there not incontinency? Nor 
health, were there not sickness? Nor truth, were there not 
lies?  Nor happiness, were there not mischances?28 
 
A systematic survey of ÔhappinessÕ in printed texts between the translations 
of Caxton and Robinson confirms the pervasiveness of ÔhapÕ as the root 
meaning of happiness. Of the 74 hits for ÔhappinessÕ between 1473 and 1559 
it has been possible to find and contextualize 61 of its uses in the first 
editions of texts (Figure 1).29 Across this sample, ÔhappinessÕ denoted hap 
twenty-four times (40 per cent), referring to luck as diverse as Ôworldly 
fortuneÕ, the Immaculate Conception, or the spoonfuls of ÔhappinessÕ and 
ÔunhapÕ ladled onto cities by pagan Gods.30 But as well as signifying hap, 
between the 1470s and the 1550s ÔhappinessÕ was increasingly used to do 
new semantic work, accumulating connotations that it had not previously 
possessed, at least in print.  
 
                                                        
27 Lefevre, Troy, 10r. 
28 Baldassarre Castiglione, The Courtier, trans. Thomas Hoby (1561), L2v. 
29 The hits were located on EEBO on 14.09.2015. 
30 Jacques Legrand, The Book of Good Manners (1487), D3v; Gaia Servadio, Renaissance 
Woman (New York, 2005), 193; Eric L. Saak, ÔAugustine in the Later Middle Ages to the 
ReformationÕ in Mark Vessey, ed., A Companion to Augustine (Oxford, Blackwell, 2012), 
473. Desiderius Erasmus, The First Tome or Volume of the Paraphrase of Erasmus upon the New 
Testament, translated by Nicholas Udall (1548), 24. Robert Dick Sider, Paraphrases on 
Romans and Galatians: Volume 42, Collected Works of Erasmus (Toronto, 1984), xxx. William 
Hugh, The Troubled ManÕs Medicine (1646), C4r; Alec Ryrie, The Gospel and Henry VIII: 
Evangelicals in the Early English Reformation (Cambridge, 2003), 176. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
The most pervasive of these was the classical/Romance notion of 
felicitas/felicite. Given the synonymy between the two terms, this was, 
perhaps, hardly unexpected: just as the Latin concept could intimate degrees 
of fortune as well as contentment, so the realization of hap necessarily 
implied felicitous feelings. More puzzling is why ÔhappinessÕ was needed at 
all. As Rissanen notes, by the end of the fifteenth century ÔfelicityÕ was a 
well-established loan word in English and English authors before the 1550s 
almost invariably used ÔfelicityÕ to connote felicitous feelings and 
experiences, be they material, emotional, corporeal, or psychological.  
 
It is interesting, therefore, that the first use of ÔhappinessÕ for ÔfelicityÕ 
occurred in a translation of Guillaume TardifÕs LÕArt de Bien Mourir , itself 
rendered from an unidentified Latin text.31 The ars moriendi (art of dying) 
genre was extremely popular in late medieval literary culture and TardifÕs 
text was translated at least twice from the French into English in quick 
succession: in 1505 in London by the productive Andrew Chertsey in The 
Craft to Lyve Well and Dye Well, and in 1503 in Paris in The Book Intytuled The 
Art of Good Lywyng [and] Good Deyng, which is attributed to Thomas 
Lewington.32 Along with the printer Wynkyn de Worde, Chertsey produced 
                                                        
31 LÕArt de Bien Mourir, trans. Guillaume Tardif (printed Antoine Vrard, Paris, 1498).  
32 Andrew Chertsey, The Craft to Live Well and to Die well, (Westminster?: Wynkyn de 
Worde, 1505); Thomas Lewington, The Book Intituled The Art of Good Living [and] Good 
Dying (Paris, 1503). 
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an accurate copy that was popular enough to go into several editions. The 
ÔLewingtonÕ copy, in contrast, is such a bad translation that Alice Hamilton 
has dubbed it ÔvileÕ.33 Certainly the mistakes, confusions, and lack of 
grammatical structure suggest a translator unused to writing in English.  The 
sentence ÔHelas comme dure departie de souuerain bien en souuerain mal de 
toute felicie en toute misere/ De pardurable paix en enternelle & 
abhominable confusionÕ is a case in point.34 Part of a longer meditation on 
the contrasting fates of the saved and the damned, Chertsey rendered the 
passage ÔAlas how hard is this world depart ye from sovereign wealth into 
sovereign ill from all felicity into all misery from perdurable peace into 
eternal and abominable confusionÕ.35 ÔLewingtonÕ, in comparison, came up 
with ÔHelas what one heard departing of the sovereign good in the sovereign 
evil of all happiness in all wretchedness of everlasting pains in everlasting 
and abominable confusionÕ.36 Without the Tardif and Chertsey versions as 
prompts, that is, this first printed use of ÔhappinessÕ as felicity makes very 
little sense. More intriguingly, that ÔLewingtonÕ conjoined ÔhappinessÕ and 
ÔwretchednessÕ Ð words derived from Norse and Saxon Ð instead of ÔfelicityÕ 
and ÔmiseryÕ Ð French and Anglo-Norman words Ð points, perhaps, to an 
attempt to render the text into a spoken rather than literary English 
vernacular. 
 
That it took another thirty years for ÔhappinessÕ to translate felicity 
again suggests that the cultural impact of the Lewington copy was minimal, 
at least in printed discourse.  When it did happen, it was in translations of 
humanist and reformist literature published in the 1530s. In these instances, 
ÔhappinessÕ was used in conjunction with ÔfelicityÕ rather than instead of it, 
perhaps to make a literary and so potentially difficult word explicable for a 
vernacular audience. Thus an edition of ErasmusÕs Declamatio in laudem 
nobilissimae artis medicinae, commissioned by the experienced printer Robert 
Redman in 1537, ridiculed the popular sentiment that Ð  
 
He that lives after the rules of physic lives wretchedly. As though it 
were an happiness and felicity, the body to be swollen and stretched 
out with surfeiting, to be brasted with the pleasure of the body, to 
wax foggyshe with drinking of good ale, & to be sepulte and drowned 
in sleep.37 
                                                        
33 Alice Hamilton, ÔOrthodoxy in Late Fifteenth Century Glass in LeicesterÕ, Transactions 
of the Leicestershire Archaeological and Historical Society, 55, 1979-80, 31. 
34 Tardif, LÕArt de Bien Mourir, A2v. 
35 Chertsey, The Craft to Live Well, Aa1r. 
36 Lewington, The Art of Good Living, N2v. 
37 Desiderius Erasmus, Declamatio in laudem nobilissimae artis medicinae, A Declamation in 
the Praise and Commendation of the Most High and Excellent Science of Physic (1537), C4r; 
Alexandra Gillespie, ÔRedman, Robert (d. 1540)Õ, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
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A year later a translation of Martin LutherÕs Exposition Upon the Song of the 
Blessed Virgin Mary contrasted Ôthe felicity or happiness of this worldÕ with 
the remission of sins.38 Translated by John Hollybush (possibly a 
pseudonym of Miles Coverdale), it also asked the reader Ôwhat tongue can 
utter the felicity & happiness of such as have this knowledge, that John is 
come to give É that [God] forgives them their sinsÕ.39 It was only at the end 
of the decade that the schoolmaster, grammarian, reformer, and translator 
John Palsgrave Ð who was also a friend of Erasmus Ð used ÔhappinessÕ 
without felicity alongside it. In his Latin/English edition of The Comedy of 
Acolastus, Palsgrave carefully used ÔhappinessÕ to translate the Latin 
ÔfoeliciterÕ; but he also specified the kind of felicity that the happiness took: 
ÔNow at the last do I feel and perceive, how great a happiness or quiet (it is) 
to a father to have his children by all things and in every condition obedient 
(unto him)Õ.40  
 
Whether these moves served to expand the meaning of the word in 
every day speech or simply acknowledged the ordinary sense of the term as 
it had developed outwith printed discourse is difficult to say. However, two 
other concepts to migrate to ÔhappinessÕ by the 1550s offer more concrete 
evidence that the word became an important conduit of classical and 
patristic ideas into vernacular and spoken English. These were the Greek 
notion of eudaimonia and the Latin sense of summum bonum: on the one hand, 
the realization and fulfillment of perfect and ÔnaturalÕ selfhood; on the other 
hand, the overarching ideal Ð or Ôsovereign goodÕ Ð upon which the good 
life, the good person, and the good afterlife is based. These concepts, of 
course, have intricate histories within the realms of western philosophy and 
Christian thought: the concern here is less with their substantive 
appropriation and definition in different intellectual traditions (whether 
Stoic or Epicurean ethics, for example, or Augustinian or Calvinist theology) 
and more with when ÔhappinessÕ became a word used to render the states so 
conceived and described.41  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/23261, accessed 19 Sept 2015]. 
38 Martin Luther, Exposition Upon the Song of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Called Magnificat, 
translated by John Hollybush (1538), M3r.  
39 Ibid., N6v. 
40 John Palsgrave, Joannis Palsgravi Londoniensis, Ecphrasis Anglica in Comoediam Acolasti The 
Comedy of Acolastus (1540), C1r, C3r. 
41 IÕd like to thank Philip Reynolds for discussing these issues and for his essay ÔThe 
Biblical Definitions of the Pursuit if HappinessÕ, posted at 
www.huffingtonpost.com/philip-reynolds/the-pursuit-of-what_b_781092.html. 
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The first transparent appropriation of happiness for these kinds of 
conceptual purposes was by Thomas Elyot in his translation of PlutarchÕs 
The Education and Bringing Up of Children, published in 1532.42 Elyot quite 
deliberately wrenched ÔhappinessÕ away from ÔfortuneÕ to make it the 
outcome of a more calculated process of education and self-improvement. 
This depended, in turn, on taking the adjective ÔhappyÕ to connote felicity Ð 
contentment Ð as well as luck, and using ÔunhappinessÕ to indicate its deficit. 
This was all done in the chapter on ÔThe inconveniences which happen for 
default of learning, and the comparison of learning to other qualitiesÕ. Here 
Elyot had Plutarch promise Ôto shew what happens often to these 
monstrous fathers É when they have lewdly and unhappily nourished and 
brought up their childrenÕ to Ôdespise all wholesome doctrine & vertuous 
order of livingÕ for the sake of Ôinordinate pleasuresÕ and Ôservile and 
abominable voluptuosities & vicesÕ.43 Elyot was in no doubt that the 
subsequent Ômischief and unhappinessÕ of children would leave parents 
Ôcontinually in their minds tormentedÕ. But he also took the opportunity to 
make the broader Platonic point about the relative merits of different kinds 
of felicity: honour, health, and so on.44 It transpired that, ÔGenerally two 
special things be in the nature of man which be good, that is to say, 
knowledge and reason.Õ To clinch the point, Elyot translated Plutarch citing 
Socrates Ð 
 
For when Gorgias the Rhetorician (as I remember me) demanded of 
him, if he thought the king of Persia to be happy: I know not said he, 
how much he hath of vertue and learning. As who says, in those 
things stands happiness, and not in the treasure and gifts of 
Fortune.45 
 
The cord between happiness and hap was broken. 
 
 PlutarchÕs Platonism (as translated by Elyot) privileged the life of the 
mind over the material and sensory world as the source of happiness. 
Another early use of ÔhappinessÕ as a deliberative rather than haphazard 
process instead drew upon an Aristotelian framework for understanding the 
nature of the felicitousness for which people should strive. This was by John 
Wilkinson in his translation of the abridged Italian version of AristotleÕs 
                                                        
42 Plutarch, The Education or Bringing Up of Children, Translated out of Plutarch by Sir Thomas 
Elyot (1532). 
43 Ibid., L5v. 
44 Ibid., L5v. 
45 Ibid., L5r. 
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Ethics for Edward Stanley, the third earl of Derby, in 1547.46 As well as the 
first vernacular rendition of Aristotle, WilkinsonÕs translation is interesting 
because ÔhappinessÕ is not completely denuded of hap. It is ÔbeatitudeÕ that 
mostly bears the burden of ideal felicity throughout the text, which is in turn 
closely linked to ÔvertueÕ.47 Happiness, in contrast, is only used twice. On the 
first occasion it was still linked to fortune Ð a fortune that, importantly, was 
itself indicative of divine will: ÔThe happiness of the man that is well 
fortuned, is so much to be praised, as a thing sent from God, and is so 
much to be honored & commendedÕ.48 But in the second instance, 
ÔhappinessÕ as the ideally felicitous state becomes more explicit, with just 
laws Ð rather than GodÕs will Ð enabling virtuous actions. As Wilkinson put 
it: ÔThe law is just, and all things of the law be just, for it commands the 
works of vertue: which works make a man happy, and conserves the works 
of happiness in him, and forbids all evil in cities and countries, and 
commands unto good men great worksÕ.49 
 
While these developments were important, it was the 1550s that 
marked the pivotal moment in the semantic formation of ÔhappinessÕ. 
Perhaps most importantly in terms of its subsequent ascent, John Harington 
used the term three times in his 1550 translation of CiceroÕs book of 
friendship.50 Harington wrote his translation of this iconic Renaissance text 
as a political prisoner alongside leading public figures like Thomas Seymour, 
the Dudley brothers, and Thomas Smith; and he dedicated it to the 
influential Protestant patroness Katherine Brandon, Duchess of Suffolk.51 If 
this gives some clue as to the scribal community to whom his choice of 
language made sense, then so does his philosophy of translation. Harington 
explained that Ôfor lack of a fine and flowing style, I have used the plain and 
common speechÕ. But he also Ôconferred with the Latin author, and so by 
the known well learned to be correctedÕ.52 For Harington this combination 
of vernacular English and original Latin meant Ð  
 
                                                        
46 John Wilkinson, The Ethiques of Aristotle, That is to Say, Precepts of good Behauoute [sic] and 
Perfect Honesty, Now Newly translated into English (1547). The Italian translation has been 
attributed to Brunetto Latini and also Taddeo Alderotti. 
47 See for example Ibid., A6rÐB2v. 
48 Ibid., B1r. In his 1542 Bibliotheca Eliotae Thomas Elyot likewise translated beat as 
Ôhappily, fortunatelyÕ. 
49 Ibid., E8v. 
50 John Harington, The Book of Friendship of Marcus Tullie Cicero (1550). Harington claimed 
in the preface to have copied the French translation by Jean Collin and an original 
version. 
51 Ibid., A2r-A3v; Ruth Ahnert, The Rise of Prison Literature in the Sixteenth Century 
(Cambridge, 2013), 90Ð 100; Ruth Hughey, John Harington of Stepney (Ohio, 1971). 
52 Harington, Book of Friendship, A3r. 
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a new spirit and life was given it, and many parts seemed as it were 
with a new coat arrayed, as well for the orderly placing and eloquently 
changing of some words, as also for the plainly opening and learnedly 
amending of the sense, which in the French translation was 
somewhat darkened, and by me for lack of knowledge in many places 
missed.53 
    
Whether Harrington was thinking explicitly of ÔhappinessÕ is unclear (though 
it perhaps articulates the same thinking behind the less successful Lewington 
translation); but his use of the word is striking and also unprecedented in 
translations of Cicero. First, Harington intimated ÔhappinessÕ as the ultimate 
felicity, noting how all friendships are vulnerable to rivalries, rancour, and 
even malice, and suggesting that ÔThese many things so hang over 
friendship, even as one should say, by destiny, that he [said] to escape all 
these, he thought it to be not only a parte of wisdom, but also of 
very happinessÕ.54 Second, he echoed Palsgrave in suggesting what 
constitutes felicity: ÔFor they say, quietness is the chief point of happiness, 
which the mind cannot enjoyÕ if it is worrying about the problems of too 
many friends.55 But most strikingly, Harington unhesitatingly used happiness 
to depict the summum bonum and the good life, both of which were closely 
linked to virtuous friendship and which he regarded as Ônatures 
chief happinessÕ and the key to Ôthe happy lifeÕ.56 
 
Aside from now figuring in English Ciceronian discourse, three other 
features of the wordÕs use during the 1550s anticipate the future popularity 
of ÔhappinessÕ. The first was the consolidation of ÔhappinessÕ as an Erasmian 
term, most emphatically in Robert BurrantÕs translation of ErasmusÕs 
annotations of CatoÕs Precepts in 1553.57 Arranged as wise epigrams with 
pithy explanatory glosses, the short text contained no less than eight uses of 
ÔhappinessÕ Ð usually to denote fortune, occasionally in a more complex 
sense of felicity and eudaimonia.58 In the meantime the Erasmian Richard 
Sherrey published the first English handbook on how to write figures of 
speech.59 In it he illustrated the technique of enumeration with an account of 
                                                        
53 Ibid., A4v. 
54 Ibid., 26. 
55 Ibid., 32. 
56 Ibid., 53v-53r. 
57 Robert Burrant, Precepts of Cato with Annotations of D. Erasmus of Rotterdam Very Profitable 
for All (1553).  
58 See, for example, Burrant, Precepts V6r; N2v-N2r. 
59 Nicholas Orme, ÔSherrey , Richard (b. c.1505)Õ, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008. 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/25389, accessed 13 Sept 2015] 
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CiceroÕs defeat of the Catilinarian conspirators.60 Sherrey explained how Ôthe 
consul did quickly smell out by his foresight, and by his singular vigilance 
sought them out, by his high prudence espied them, by his incredible 
eloquence convinced them, and by his grave authority repressed them, by 
force of arms subdued them, & with great happiness took them quite 
awayÕ.61 Second, in a related development ÔhappinessÕ was used much more 
regularly to depict Christian blessedness; indeed it was Sherrey who (also in 
1550) equated Ôthe life in ParadiseÕ with Ôthe happiness that [man] had lost.62 
Likewise the Marian martyr John Bradford advised his audience to ask God 
Ôto make my body such a companion, or rather a minister of godliness, to 
my soul, in this present life, that in the life to come it may partake with the 
same everlasting happiness by Jesus Christ our LordÕ.63  
 
Finally, it was in the 1550s that ÔhappinessÕ was explicitly used to 
describe the aspirations of societies and commonwealths as well as 
individuals. This had been intimated in WilkinsonÕs Aristotelian connection 
of happiness and law; it was developed much more clearly by the lawyer and 
translator William Bavande in his 1559 translation of the German humanist 
Johannes FerrariusÕs De Republica Bene Instituenda.64 Bavande joined with 
Cicero and Ferrarius in noting Ôthe wealth of Citizens, the safety of Cites, 
and the quietness and happiness of mans lifeÕ were all established by lawsÕ.65 
He also justified all Ôstudies of humanityÕ on the grounds that they Ôhave 
always[s] from the beginning helped common weals É because no man can 
more perfectly reason and decide of the vertue and happiness which we seek 
in the society of men, then he that hath the knowledge of such things as 
belong to god and manÕ.66 Moreover, he did so as a man embedded in the 
literary culture of the Inns of Court, suggesting that by the beginning of 
1560s the semantically complex sense of ÔhappinessÕ was normative within 
an extremely influential community of translators, authors and readers.67 
 
 BavandeÕs translation marked, in fact, a kind of watershed in the 
vernacular formation of ÔhappinessÕ. Bavande used the word relatively often 
                                                        
60 Richard Sherrey, A Treatise of Schemes [and] Tropes very Profitable for the Better Understanding 
of Good Authors (1550), E1r.  
61 Sherrey, A Treatise of Schemes, Er. 
62 Richard Sherrey, A Very fruitful Exposition Upon the Six Paper of Saint John Divided into. x. 
Homilies or Sermons: written in Latin by the Right Excellent Clarke [sic] Master Johann Brenz 
(1550), F5v. 
63 John Bradford, A Godly Meditation Composed by the Faithful (1559), B1r. 
64 William Bavande, A Work of Johannes Ferrarius Montanus, Touching the Good Ordering of a 
Common weal (1559). 
65 Ibid., 49r. 
66 Ibid., 59. 
67 Jessica Winston, Lawyers at Play: Literature, Politics, and Law at the Early Modern Inns of 
Court (Oxford, 2016). 
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Ð ten times in all Ð and he did so in all the senses that had been introduced 
over the previous decades aside from hap. Thus Bavande not only used it to 
describe a collective and political aspiration, but also distinguished between 
Ôheavenly life, and true happinessÕ (Christian ÔblessednessÕ) and the ÔcivilÕ 
happiness (ÔfelicityÕ) that was achievable on earth. In particular, he used 
ÔhappinessÕ to describe the alternative ancient philosophies regarding the 
good life and ideal felicity before the Ôtrue happinessÕ of Christianity was 
made apparent to the world: that some ancients Ôaccompt the wealth of the 
world & outward goods, happinessÕ, while others Ôdo place happiness, in the 
goods of the mind.68 Along with evangelical proponents of Ôtrue happinessÕ, 
these ÔPhilosophersÕ were to have a profound influence on the sensibilities 
of educated Englishmen and women over the next hundred years or more; 
and ÔhappinessÕ was one of the words through which they did so. 
 
 
The Rise of Happiness 
ÔHappinessÕ did not appear fully formed in early modern English, as 
historians and social scientists tend to assume. Rather it was only in the 
seventy or so years after CaxtonÕs first use of the term in print that 
ÔhappinessÕ began to accrue meanings beyond its medieval sense of hap: 
felicity, eudaimonia, and summum bonum (Christian and classical). It was in 
vernacular translations of reformist and humanist literature that this 
semantic expansion occurred: this was a word that, in its newer 
manifestations, was associated with Luther, Elyot, Plutarch, Aristotle, and, 
most importantly, Erasmus and Cicero. And it was through the energies of 
influential scribal communities that these translations occurred Ð whether 
Harrington and his network of prestigious Protestant prisoners and patrons, 
or Bavande and the legal fraternities of the Inns of Court. That in these early 
decades authors often used ÔhappinessÕ in the name of Ôplain EnglishÕ and in 
texts designed to disseminate unfamiliar ideas to vernacular audiences 
suggests that the word was more ÔpopularÕ and recognizable than its literary 
and classical equivalents. Certainly ÔhappinessÕ translated ÔfelicityÕ in Robert 
CawdreyÕs dictionary of Ôhard usual English words, borrowed from the 
Hebrew, Greek, Latin, or French &c É with the interpretation thereof by 
plain English words, gathered for the benefit and help of all unskillful 
personsÕ.69 But in using ÔhappinessÕ as a conceptual conduit the same authors 
could not help but turn the simple designation of hap into a complex and 
multivalent term.  
 
It is this combination of popular purchase and semantic complexity 
that helps explain the rise of happiness after 1550. The pace and scale of this 
                                                        
68 Ibid., 3. 
69 Robert Cawdrey, A Table Alphabetical (1609), Titlepage. 
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rise can be gauged simply through the number of ÔhitsÕ in texts catalogued 
on Early English Books Online (EEBO) made searchable by Text Creation 
Partnership (TCP) Ð a crude and in some respects problematic method of 
quantification, but indicative nonetheless. Though ignored by Robinson and 
his citizen readers in 1551 and 1556, the term doubled in use in vernacular 
print in the 1550s (to 37 hits) and then more than doubled per decade until 
the 1590s, to 1913 hits (see Figure 2). By the seventeenth century happiness 
was clearly an established fixture in printed texts, with significant increases 
in the number of hits in the 1610s, 1630s, and 1650s, and a notable dip in 
the 1660s. 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
This story of a tardy but ultimately significant take off is evident when hits 
of ÔhappinessÕ are compared with those of ÔfelicityÕ. Figure 3 confirms that 
for most of the sixteenth century ÔfelicityÕ appeared much more frequently in 
printed texts than ÔhappinessÕ: it has 162 hits on EEBO-TCP even before 
1500, 699 hits by the 1540s, and a peak of 2512 hits in the 1580s. In the 
1590s, however, ÔhappinessÕ overtook ÔfelicityÕ for the first time and 
remained the commonplace term of preference thereafter, so that by the 
1650s ÔhappinessÕ has 13850 hits compared to felicityÕs 4243, and by the 
1690s the difference is 15862 hits compared to 2692. 
 
Figure 3 
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Appearances of ÔhappinessÕ and ÔfelicityÕ on printed titlepages 
corroborate this more general pattern. The vocabulary of titlepages offer a 
more precise index of usage than general surveys of all text in that the 
searches tend to be more reliable, comprehensive, and easier to 
contextualize. They are also more suggestive of a wordÕs cultural purchase, 
because titles can be expected to resonate with and speak to anticipated 
audiences.70 Figure 4 shows that until the 1570s a few titlepages contained 
felicity (as many as seven in the 1540s) and none happiness. This then 
switched, though the number of titles emblazoned with either word 
remained relatively small. However, in the 1610s the number of titlepages 
featuring happiness increased significantly, to 51, and the 1640s saw a peak 
of 136. While the term receded somewhat from view thereafter, the word 
was clearly much more visible after 1660 than before 1640. Of course, these 
increasing appearances of happiness in part reflected the general increase in 
the amount of printed material produced over the period. It is therefore 
instructive to consider the number of titlepages featuring ÔfelicityÕ or 
ÔhappinessÕ as a percentage of all surviving catalogued texts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
                                                        
70 Withington, Society, 8Ð9. 
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Figure 5 shows that, proportionally, it was the 1610s rather than the 1640s 
or 1650s that was the peak decade for happiness on titlepages, with just over 
one per cent of all titles bearing the word, and that the word then appeared 
proportionally less often over the course of the seventeenth century.  
 
 
Figure 5 
 
 
This trend is also evident when ÔpleasureÕ is put into the mix, Figure 6 nicely 
summarising the key features of happinessÕs diachronic history: that the 
word only began to become a regular fixture in printed discourse after 1550; 
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that it had superseded felicity by the 1590s; that it was established as a 
commonplace of printed discourse by the 1610s; and that it had overtaken a 
perennial affinity term like ÔpleasureÕ by the second half of the seventeenth 
century. 
 
Figure 6 
 
 
 
Happiness and Utopia  
On the face of it, then, it seems fairly obvious why Burnet made Utopia in 
part a book about happiness and Robinson did not. In the 1550s ÔhappinessÕ 
was a rare term, at least in print, which was only just acquiring its modern 
meanings; by the 1680s it was a commonplace with a host of potential 
connotations beyond the sense of hap. But, as always, there is more to it 
than that. First, Burnet was a writer particularly enamoured with ÔhappinessÕ; 
indeed Table 1 shows that it is difficult to find an author who used the word 
in print more than Burnet during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
As such, it is perhaps entirely predictable that he should be generous with 
his use of ÔhappinessÕ when rendering Utopia into Ômodern EnglishÕ. 
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Table 1  Gilbert BurnetÕs Use of ÔHappinessÕ Compared71 
 
Author  Uses of Felicity Uses of Happiness 
 
Thomas Elyot  51   1 
Ralph Robinson  12   0 
Cicero (16th C)  44   18 
Cicero (17th C)  18   137 
Thomas Morton  10   226 
Thomas Gainsford  26   110 
Francis Rous  101   383 
Samuel Hartlib  10   61 
Thomas Hobbes  43   26 
John Locke   5   108 
Gilbert Burnet  31   331 
Nicholas Barbon  0   0 
John Houghton  0   4 
William Petty  1   4 
 
 
Second, there is the nature of Utopia itself. This was a place, or no-place, 
that was meant to embody reason and wisdom: the characterization of its 
government, its customs, and the behaviour of its citizens was a critical 
experiment in reflective thought pushed to its logical and sometimes playful 
extreme. For Robinson in the 1550s, MoreÕs imaginary society would have 
signified the antithesis of happiness. Utopia represented the triumph of man 
over capricious fortune: Utopians would never have heard of the term. 
Burnet, in contrast, inherited a different sense of happiness: a complex word 
that, while rooted in the stem hap, had transmuted into a term of ÔartÕ or 
ÔscienceÕ. Because of both its accretion of classical and patristic concepts and 
its assimilation into renaissance and reformation discourses Ð Erasmian, 
Ciceronian, Aristotelian; Lutheran, Calvinist, and eventually Latitudinarian Ð 
ÔhappinessÕ became a state or condition to be calculated and pursued rather 
than the outcome of chance. 
 
 There is no space to trace in detail the nature of this transition here: 
such an undertaking would require excavating most aspects of English print 
culture from the 1560s on. Its extent can be evidenced, however, by three 
texts that took ÔhappinessÕ as their organizing paradigm. In his A Treatise of 
                                                        
71 The table is based on hits on EEBO-TCP and compares Burton against a range of 
authors: those who used the word unusually often in print; political economists discussed 
by Slack; exponents of the new philosophy compared to sixteenth-century humanists; 
and sixteenth and seventeenth century translations of Cicero. 
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the Threefold State of Man, published in 1596, the Calvinist Thomas Morton 
explained to his readers that Ôwe have rather applied our style to the capacity 
of the simple, and the good of allÕ.72 This involved using ÔhappinessÕ in its 
various conceptual guises in order to explain humanityÕs progression from 
original innocence (or happiness) to sinfulness after the Fall (worldly 
happiness and misery) to redemption in Christ (eternal happiness). The 
result was a popular piece of Calvinist theology that used ÔhappinessÕ 184 
times. Twenty-two years later, in The Glory of England, the popular writer 
Thomas Gainsford adapted an Aristotelian sense of ÔhappinessÕ as the 
concept with which to compare national wellbeing on a global scale. Taking 
the wise rule of Solomon as the benchmark in governmental efficacy, 
Gainsford established that of all the worldÕs nations it was England that 
came closest to matching the Old Testament kingdomÕs ability to engender 
Ôsufficiency and fullness of happinessÕ.73 In making the argument, Gainsford 
used the word 61 times. These Calvinist and Aristotelian discourses merged 
and mutated in the writings of Francis Rous. Born in 1580 and dying in 
1659, Rous bridged the late Elizabethan and Cromwellian eras and, as a 
Spenserian poet and author of the standard seventeenth-century version of 
the Psalms of David, spoke to EnglandÕs humanist and evangelical cultures.74 
His treatise on The Art of Happiness Ð published in 1619 and 1631 Ð used the 
word 221 times. In it he argued for a classically and spiritually informed 
sense of summum bonum over the worldly felicities of honours, riches, and 
worldly pleasures (while confirming, in the process, that worldly pleasures 
could be a happiness all the same). And like Morton and Gainsford, Rous 
served notice that whatever the Ôcontentation of our desiresÕ might be, 
people and institutions should be Ôinstrumental towards your own 
happinessÕ, as Samuel Hartlib urged the House of Commons in 1647.75 
 
That Gilbert Burnet inherited this conviction of happiness as ÔartÕ 
rather than ÔhapÕ becomes apparent as soon as his conception of Utopian 
ÔhappinessÕ is read alongside MoreÕs Latin original text and RobinsonÕs 1556 
translation. In the first instance, the comparison nicely demonstrates the 
conceptual enrichment of ÔhappinessÕ since 1556: Burnet uses the word in 
most of the ways anticipated by the semantic developments of the early 
sixteenth century, adding a few extra besides (see Table 2). But second, in 
                                                        
72 Thomas Morton, A Treatise of the Threefold State of Man, A7r. 
73 Thomas Gainsford, The Glory of England, or A True Description of Many Excellent 
Prerogatives and Remarkable Blessings, whereby she Triumph over all the Nations of the world (1618), 
titlepage. 
74 Colin Burrow, ÔRous, Francis (1580/81Ð1659)Õ, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/24171, accessed 13 Nov 2015]. 
75 Samuel Hartlib, Considerations Tending to the Happy Accomplishment of EnglandÕs Reformation 
and State (1647), 2. 
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each of these instances ÔhappinessÕ described or prescribed governments and 
citizens purposefully pursuing their individual or collective aims rather than 
bending powerless in the face of hap. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  ÔHappinessÕ in BurnetÕs Utopia 
 
 Latin 1516     Robinson 1556   
Felicitas/ felicitatem   felicity 
populo bene/ populi bono  wealth of the people/peoples  
reipublicae     commonwealth  
summum bonum    perfect blessedness  
laetam     joy and mirth   
voluptas, aut nausea   pleasure or displeasure  
 
 
To give some examples of collective happiness: More wrote that Ôeoque 
magis ad principem eam pertinere curam, ut populo bene sit suo, quam ut 
sibi, non aliter ac pastoris officium est, oues potius quam semet pascere, 
quatenus opilio estÕ. For Robinson this translated as Ôthe king ought to take 
more care for the wealth of his people than for his own wealth, even as the 
office and duty of a shepherd is, to feed his sheep rather than himselfÕ.76 For 
Burnet this meant Ôthat therefore a Prince ought to take more care of his 
Peoples Happiness, than of his own, as a Shepherd is to take more care of 
his Flock than of himselfÕ.77 Likewise when Hytholday explains the Utopian 
rationale for colonisation, More puts it as Ôcum volentibus coniuncti in idem 
vitae institutum eosdemque mores, facile coalescunt, idque utriusque populi 
bono. efficiunt enim suis institutis, ut ea terra, utrisque abunda sit, quae 
alteris ante parca ac maligna videbaturÕ. For Robinson this translated as:  
they thus joining and dwelling together do easily agree in one fashion 
of living, and that to the great wealth of both the peoples. For they so 
bring the matter about by their laws that the ground, which before 
was neither good nor profitable for the one nor the other, is now 
sufficient and fruitful for them both.78 
For Burnet, in contrast, it meant: 
                                                        
76 Sacks, Utopia, 119. 
77 Utopia, trans. Burnet, 49. 
78 Sacks, Utopia, 142. 
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where they do that [merge] of their own accord, they quickly go into 
their method of Life, and to their Rules, and this proves a happiness 
to both the Nations: for according to their constitution, such care is 
taken of the Soil, that it becomes fruitful enough for both, though it 
might be otherwise too narrow and barren for any one of them.79 
Indeed so good were the Utopians at governing that neighbouring nations 
borrowed their magistrates. Likewise for Robinson the Latin Ôatque hi 
quidem populi optime profecto ac saluberrime reipublicae suae consuluntÕ 
became ÔThese nations have undoubtedly very well and wholesomely 
provided for their commonwealthsÕ.80 For Burnet it read: ÔThey seem to 
have fallen upon a very good Expedient for their own happiness and 
safetyÕ.81  
For Burnet happiness was the deliberate result of care and 
shepherding, method and rules, expediency. But this art of happiness was 
not limited to society. It was also integral to the personÕs mental and bodily 
state. More observed Ônunc vero non in omni voluptate felicitatem, sed in 
bona, atque honesta sitam putant. ad eam enim velut ad summum bonum, 
naturam nostram ab ipsa virtute pertrahi, cui sola adversa factio felicitatem 
tribuitÕ. Robinson rendered it Ð 
But now, sir, they think not felicity to rest in all pleasure, but only in 
that pleasure that is good and honest and that hereto, as to perfect 
blessedness our nature is allured and drawn even of virtue, whereto 
only they that be of the contrary opinion do attribute felicity, for they 
define virtue to be life ordered according to virtue.82 
For Burnet:  
Yet they do not place Happiness in all sorts of Pleasures, but only in 
those that in themselves are good and honest: for whereas there is a 
Party among them that places Happiness in bare Vertue, others think 
that our Natures are conducted by Vertue to Happiness, as that 
which is the chief Good of Man.83  
A few lines on and the amount of semantic work required of happiness 
increased even more. More wrote it was Ôsecundum id commonet, atque 
excitat nos ut vitam quam licet minime anxiam, ac maxime laetam ducamus 
                                                        
79 Utopia, trans. Burnet, 89. 
80 Sacks, Utopia, 174. 
81 Utopia, trans. Burnet, 151. 
82 Sacks, Utopia, 156. 
83 Utopia, trans. Burnet, 113. 
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ipsi, ceterisque omnibus ad idem obtinendum adiutores nos pro naturae 
societate praebeamusÕ. Robinson observed that what Ôstirs and provokes us 
to lead our life out of care in joy and mirth É also moves us to help and 
further all others in respect of the society of nature to obtain and enjoy the 
same.84 For Burnet, this meant Ôwe should consider our selves as bound by 
the ties of good Nature and Humanity, to use our utmost endeavours to 
help forward the Happiness of all other PersonsÕ.85 And to conclude with 
the most striking example of happinessÕs detachment from hap: More 
justified the Utopian custom of naked pre-marital examinations by potential 
spouses on the grounds that Ôin deligenda coniuge, qua ex re aut voluptas, 
aut nausea sit totam per vitam comitaturaÕ. Robinson explained that because 
Ôchoosing a wife É shall either be pleasure or displeasure to them all their 
life afterÕ, Utopian men examined the body Ð as they would a horse Ð in case 
Ôanything in her body afterward should chance to offend or mislike them.86 
For Burnet Ð  
[Utopians]  wondered at the folly of the Men of all other Nations; 
who if they are but to buy a Horse of a small value, are so cautious, 
that they will see every part of him, and take off both his Saddle, and 
all his other Tackle, that there may be no secret Ulcer hid under any 
of them; and that yet in the choice of a Wife, on which depends 
the happiness or unhappiness of the rest of his Life, a Man should 
venture upon trust, and only see about an handbreadth of the Face, 
all the rest of the Body being covered (142).87 
Conjugal happiness Ð voluptas, pleasure Ð was no longer something to be 
left to chance. 
 
 
From Hap to Art 
Concentrating on the word ÔhappinessÕ across the sixteenth as well as the 
seventeenth centuries challenges the story told by Slack in at least two ways. 
In the first instance, it reveals that ÔhappinessÕ was not an immemorial 
Christian and philosophical term that only came to intimate material 
affluence and sensory and subjective pleasures in the later seventeenth 
century. On the contrary, as the designation of hap the word already carried 
these worldly connotations circa 1500. It was only when ÔhappinessÕ began to 
appear in translations of classical and reformation texts, and became a 
vernacular conduit for philosophical and patristic ideas, that it acquired its 
more complex semantics. Viewed in these terms, the adoption of the term 
                                                        
84 Sacks, Utopia, 156. 
85 Utopia, trans. Burnet, 114. 
86 Sacks, Utopia, 171. 
87 Utopia, trans. Burnet, 142. 
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by political economists to describe individual or collective affluence after 
1650 marked, if anything, a reversion in sense rather than a moment of 
modernity. Second, however, it is not at all clear that political economists 
did come to Ôshare a vocabulary of happinessÕ to articulate their materialism. 
As Table 1 shows, political economists like John Houghton, Nicholas 
Barbon and William Petty rarely used the term in print; when they did so, it 
was either to denote a general and very familiar sense of worldly fortune and 
felicity Ð HoughtonÕs title ÔEnglandÕs Great HappinessÕ Ð or to describe 
what Petty described as the ÔSpiritual happinessÕ of the papist Irish.88 And 
while certainly a proponent of happiness, Hartlib also tended to fix it in 
religious discourses.89  
 
The same was true for proponents of the Ônew philosophyÕ such as 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Hobbes was certainly influential in 
reconceiving worldly contentment in terms of sensory gratification. But in 
Leviathan he was also scrupulous in distinguishing between ÔcivilÕ felicity and 
ÔtrueÕ spiritual bliss. This he did by using ÔfelicityÕ to describe the former and 
ÔhappinessÕ to denote the latter: in Leviathan it was the displaced term 
ÔfelicityÕ that described worldly enjoyments Ð whatever they might be Ð with 
ÔhappinessÕ demarcating the unknowable promise of Ôsovereign goodÕ.90 
While Locke was much less discerning than Hobbes in his use of ÔhappinessÕ 
Ð using it to describe material, sensory, and spiritual pleasures in the manner 
of Burnet Ð it is difficult to see how his acknowledgement of the many 
different sources of happiness available circa 1690 was especially different 
from the range of alternatives mapped by translators and writers over the 
previous century and a half.91 Certainly what puzzled Locke was the same 
question that had worried generations of early modern thinkers: the 
tendency of people to put worldly happiness, which was pleasurable but 
temporary, before the realisation of an everlasting summum bonum. This 
should not be surprising. The invention of happiness was a protracted rather 
than a sudden affair that involved, at heart, the transformation of a term of 
hap into the work of art. It is here that the antecedents of our modern 
preoccupation with the happiness industry and happiness by design lies; or 
what Rous styled in 1598 Ôthe astronomy of happinessÕ.92  
                                                        
88 William Petty, The Political Anatomy of Ireland (1691), 95, 24. 
89 For example fn. 70 above. 
90 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), 58, 189, 230, 240, 245, 335. 
91 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), 123-9.  
92 Francis Rous, Thule, or Vertues History. To the Honourable and Vertuous Mistress Amy Audely 
(1598), R5r. 
